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Abstract 
Knijnenburg, P.M.W. and J. van Leeuwen, On models for propositional dynamic logic, Theoretical 
Computer Science 91 (1991) 181-203. 
In this paper we study some foundational aspects of the theory of PDL. We prove a claim made by 
Parikh (1981), namely, the existence of a Kripke model % that is universal in the sense that every 
other Kripke model .& can be isomorphically embedded in it. Using this model we give different and 
particularly easy proofs of the completeness theorem for the Segerberg axiomatization of PDL and 
the small model theorem. We also give an infinitary axiomatization for PDL and prove it to be 
complete using a syntax model d, by a technique that is well-known from modal logic. We prove 
that @ and d are isomorphic. Finally, we briefly turn to dynamic algebras and show that the 
characteristic algebra of @ is initial in the class of *-continuous dynamic algebras. 
1. Introduction 
Logics of programs are formal systems for reasoning about the behavior of 
computer programs. In these formal systems, computer programs are viewed as 
a means to enable certain logical formulae. The formulae may be propositional or first 
order, giving rise to propositional and first-order program logics, respectively. Pratt 
[ 133 recognized the possibility of modeling program logics by means of modal logic. 
His idea was fully developed by Fischer and Ladner [3] and many other authors; see 
Hare1 [6] and Kozen and Tiuryn [ 1 l] for a survey of results. If we view a program to 
be defined by its input/output (before/after) behavior, then modal logic provides 
a natural framework in which we can develop a program logic. Each program c1 is 
associated with its “own” modal operator O,, or (tl). For a propositional program 
logic we can take a set of primitive programs and rules that determine how more 
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complex programs can be built. With each rule we can define how the modal operator 
for the more complex program relates to the modal operators of the building blocks. 
In this approach the modal operators for the primitive programs are parameters. See 
Goldblatt [4] for an introduction to modal logic and its connection with logics of 
programs. 
In this paper we focus attention on a propositional program logic, namely, proposi- 
tional dynamic logic (PDL). In PDL programs are regular expressions over a set of 
primitive programs; in particular, there is a nondeterministic looping operator * for 
programs. In the PDL framework, programs can enable propositions by means of 
a possibility operator 0. Thus, when a is a program and C#J is a proposition, a 0 4 states 
“program CI can terminate with 4 holding upon termination”. We will write (a)~$ 
instead of ~04, as is common in PDL. In this paper we study some foundational 
aspects of the syntax and semantics of PDL and focus attention on the consequences 
of introducing the looping operator *. In a way, we argue that looping is inherently 
infinitary, thus giving rise to an infinitary axiomatization. The argument is split into 
two major parts outlined below. 
The logic is interpreted over Kripke models and we prove the existence of a Kripke 
model J& that is universal in the sense that every other Kripke model J%! can be 
isomorphically embedded in it. This proves a claim of Parikh [ 121. The model % also 
appears to be a powerful tool in the study of the logic. We give two applications. First, 
Segerberg gave an axiomatization for the logic that is sound and complete, i.e. validity 
and derivability coincide (cLf: [lo]). We give another proof of the completeness of the 
system using the model J&, which is particularly easy. Secondly, we prove the 
correctness of the construction of a small model satisfying a formula 4 iff #J is 
satisfiable as given by Sherman and Hare1 [6, 171. Again, the proof uses the model 
$2 and is particularly straightforward. 
Next, we define an infinitary axiomatization for PDL and prove it to be complete 
using a technique that is well-known from modal logic (see [4]), namely, by construct- 
ing a syntax model ,d for the logic. The state space of .@’ consists precisely of the set of 
all maximal consistent sets of formulae. As a rather immediate consequence we deduce 
that J&E&. This infinitary system can be viewed as the propositional variant of the 
infinitary axiomatization for first-order dynamic logic [4, 5,6, 111. We also show that 
we can use this technique to define a syntax model from the finitary Segerberg system, 
which is universal in the class of nonstandard Kripke models. 
In the last section we briefly introduce dynamic algebras and *-continuous dynamic 
algebras. Each Kripke model j bk is associated with a characteristic dynamic algebra 
,/z?. We show the algebra & to be initial in the class of *-continuous dynamic algebras. 
2. Preliminaries 
In this section we review the syntax and semantics of PDL. For a more detailed 
treatment, see [6, 1 I]. 
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2.1. Syntax 
The syntax of PDL is based on two disjoint sets of primitive symbols, namely, the set 
of primitive predicate symbols, and the set 
of primitive program symbols. From these base sets we inductively define the sets of 
PDL propositions @ and programs II as the smallest set satisfying: 
(2) if &$E(P, then 4V$,l4~@; 
(3) if CCEII and ~EQ, then (a)+~@; 
(4) n,sn; 
(5) if cr,/I~n, then c~ufi,a;/I,a*~n; 
(6) if LEG, then ~?EZI. 
Weabbreviatel(l~VlICI)to~A~;l~V~to~~1C/;(~-r~)A(1//~~)to~cr~. 
We further abbreviate 1 (a)1 4 to [a] 4. 
2.2. Semantics 
First we give an informal semantics for the above constructs. The meaning of the 
propositional connectives is exactly like in ordinary, classical propositional logic 
CPC. Therefore, PDL can be seen as an extension of CPC, i.e. all tautologies of CPC 
are valid PDL formulae. Primitive programs are exactly what their name suggests: 
uninterpreted programs or input/output relations, which is essentially the way we view 
programs in general. That is, programs are black boxes and their input/output 
behavior completely characterizes their relevant aspects; two programs are equivalent 
if and only if they constitute the same input/output relation. The meaning of the 
operator ; is program concatenation; thus, LX;/? means “first execute program c( and 
then execute /I”. u means nondeterministic choice; club means “choose nondeter- 
ministically program tl or fi and execute it”. The *-operator is a nondeterministic 
looping operator and c1* means “execute c1 a nondeterministically chosen number of 
times”. In the sequel we often abbreviate cc; cc; .. . . a (n times) to GI”. Thus, a* can be 
viewed as “choose n nondeterministically and execute a”“. The operator ? is a testing 
operator and 4? means “test 4 and proceed if true”. The operator 0 is the usual 
modal operator and the meaning of (a)4 is “program c( can be executed with 
4 holding upon termination”. Its dual, [a]4, therefore means “whenever program 
CI terminates, 4 holds”. 
Formally, PDL formulae are interpreted over Kripke models. 
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Definition 2.1. A Kripke model is a triple sZ=( W.~,X,~,#), where 
0 W.& is a set of states; 
0 7r.d: GOH2Wd is an interpretation function for the primitive predicate symbols; 
l p,“:l7@2 W,dx w,d is an interpretation function for the primitive program symbols. 
Usually we write a Kripke model as .d = ( W, 71, p) when no confusion can arise. We 
further use the terms “Kripke model” and “model” interchangeably. The interpreta- 
tion functions extend to the whole sets @ and l7: 
l P(uuB)=P(a)up(B 
l p(cc; fi) = P(E) 0 p( p), where 0 is relation composition; 
l p(cc*)= ui<O~(cli), the reflexive transitive closure of p(a); 
. p(#?)= {(S,S)E wx Wl=71(4)}; 
l n($vICI)=~($)u~(II/): 
0 TL(l$)= w-n(4); 
0 71((M)~)={SEWI3tEW.((S,t)EP(CI)AtE~(~))); 
We say that a proposition 4 is satisjable in a model J$ if and only if there exists 
a state s in d such that sun and we write ~2, s+ 4. We omit d when it is clear from 
the context. We say that 4 is &‘-valid and write J+ 4 if d, SF 4 for each SE W. We say 
that $I is valid and write k 4 if 4 is &-valid for every model ~2. Clearly, 4 is valid if 
and only if 14 is not satisfiable. 
In the sequel we use 4, $, . . . to denote propositions and c(, p, to denote programs. 
2.3. Axiomatization 
We now present an axiomatization for PDL as proposed by Segerberg [16]. 
Definition 2.2. The set of axioms AX for PDL contains 
(1) the axioms for propositional logic; 
(2) (a>@ A Cal II/ + (a> (4 v $1; 
(3) (a> (4 v ICI) * (co4 v <a>$; 
(4) <aufi>4 - <a>4V<fi>& 
(5) <%BM ++ <a> (B>& 
(6) ($94 - ICI A 4; 
(7) @v(~)(~*)~ + <a*)& 
(8) <a*>4 -+ +v(a*>(l~A<Co~). 
In addition we have the following inference rules. 
(1) modus ponens: from 4, 4+$, infer ti; 
(2) modal generalization: from 4, infer [cx]~, for any cc~I7. 
As usual, we define a derivation to be a finite sequence of well-formed formulae, each 
of which is an instance of an axiom or the conclusion of an inference rule, whose 
premisses occur earlier in the derivation. The last formula occurring in the derivation 
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is called the conclusion of the derivation. If, for any formula 4, there exists a derivation 
of which 4 is the conclusion, we say that 4 is derivable and write k$. 
Axioms l-3 are not particular for PDL, but hold in most modal systems. The dual 
of axiom 2 reads 
which states that the logic is normal in the terminology of modal logic. Axiom 8 is 
called the induction axiom, and is better known in its dual form 
Note the resemblance between this axiom and the induction axiom in arithmetic. 
The intuition behind axiom 8 is that if a program CI* enables a proposition 4, then the 
proposition is always true or there is a point in the looping of the program, where the 
proposition becomes true for the first time. 
Inspection of the system AX immediately gives us Theorem 2.3. 
Theorem 2.3 (soundness theorem). Zf k4, then k C#L 
A familiar fact of PDL is its lack of compactness. For an easy example, consider the 
infinite set r: 
Every finite subset T’GT has a model. Suppose (c(*)c$E~’ and let i be the largest 
integer such that 1 (u’) c$E~‘. Then each model JH that satisfies 1 (a’) C$ for j < i 
and (cr’+‘)&, satisfies r’. Yet the whole set r cannot have a model, for A is precisely 
the definition of 1 (CC*)&. Note that this noncompactness property is essentially 
caused by the *-operator. 
3. A universal model theorem for Kripke models 
In this section we establish a nontrivial property of Kripke models, namely, the 
existence of a model @ that is universal in the sense that every other model can be 
isomorphically embedded in it. In this, we prove a claim of Parikh [12], which seems 
not to have been developed in the literature before. We also exhibit some immediate 
corollaries. We first establish some facts about models for PDL. 
Definition 3.1. For each model _4’ the relation = on the state space WA is defined by 
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For each model JZY we now define the collapse of A? to be the model 4~‘~ =A$!/=: 
s,={t(s-t), 
w-KC= {S,ISE W”}, 
~Kc(Pi)={S~ISE7C.K(Pi)}~ 
p’“c(aj)={(s,,t,)l(s,t)EP’“(aj)}. 
The following lemma is immediate. 
Lemma 3.2. For each proposition 4, 
d,sI=#~ ifs JLs,I= 4. 
The lemma implies that we only need to consider models of cardinality at most K1, 
that is, the cardinality of the power set of 0. 
Proof. Clauses (1) and (2) follow immediately from the definition of k. For clause 
(3) V&k, s + [a] qf~ * Af, t + 4) iff @.(dY, t #; 4 =- A&, s k [a] 4) iff k#k(A, t + 7 4 * 
M,s+ 7(cz74) iff V$.(A,t+ tj-A!,sk (cx>$). 0 
In the light of Lemma 3.3 we can define for each model A another model A&‘~,, 
called the extension of A?‘, by 
p.“‘(a) = {(s, t)I Vc#h(A, s + [a] C#I - Af, t + +)} for a primitive. 
By Lemma 3.3, p,“(a) s pgeX(a) for each primitive program a. Note that p”(a) need 
not equal p-&-(a). Consider for example the case in which M, s + [a] C#I only if 4 is 
valid. Then, for every te W”, (s, t)Ep.“-(a). Obviously, p”‘(a) can be substantially 
larger than p,“(a). We extend pKeX to the whole set I7 in the usual way. 
Lemma 3.4. For each proposition 4, 
~fl~~,sI= 4 ifs ,@,sk 4. 
Proof. (-=): Since p.N(a)cp.MCX(a) for each primitive program a, it is easy to see that 
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for each CIEU, p”(a) opt”“. The proof proceeds by induction on the complexity of 
4. The only nontrivial case is 4 = (a) $, which follows from the inclusion given above. 
(+): Let A_, s+ 4. We define the mapping R : n~2~.” x rvJv by 
R(4={(s,r)P’$.(~,st= C~l$=~,tI= II/,> 
={(S,~)I~~.w~~k $*d,sb <=>$I 
for Ann. Note that, by Lemma 3.3(3), we may use both conditions interchangeably in 
the definition of R. 
Claim 1. A, s + $ iff A!, s bR 4, where + R is defined as the relation + except that we 
use R(a) instead of p(a). 
Proof of claim. Induction on the structure of 4. The only nontrivial case is 4 = (u) $. 
Let A, s+ (a)$. Then there exists a state t such that A, t k $ and (s, t)ep(u). But then 
(s, t)E R(cc) by the construction of R and A’, s + R (~1) $. Conversely, let A, s + R(a) II/; 
then there is a state t such that (s, t)ER(tx) and t + I). Suppose that there exists no state 
t such that (s, t)ep(a) and A, t b II/. Then A’, s + [cr] 1 II/ and, by the definition of R, if 
(s, t)E R(cr), then t + 1 II/. Contradiction. 
Claim 2. For each cr~fl,#~~(tl)~ R(a). 
Proof of claim. Induction on the complexity of CI. For cz primitive, the claim holds by 
definition. Next we consider more complex programs GI. 
Case 1: cc=/?uy. 
Clearly, p( /I u y) = p( p) up(y) G R( 8) u R(y). The last union equals 
{(s,r)lV4.(rk 4*sk (B>4)V%(rk~*sk (Y>4)). 
It is easy to see that this set is contained in 
{(s7t)I%.(tt=4-sS (P>4Vs/= <Y>4)), 
which is R( buy). 
Case 2: u=/3; y. 
Now, 
R(p)"R(~)={(s,t)13u.((s,u)~R 
Let (s, t)ER( /3) 0 R(y). Then, for each 4, 
tk4*sk<P>(Y>& 
(P)A(U,t)ER(y)) > 
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hence, (s, t) E R ( j3; y) and R ( p) 0 R (y) E R ( /3: y). 
Case 3: GI = /?*. 
By the former argument we get 
P(B”)ER(P) 
for each IZ < o. We further have, for each n < o, 
Suppose (s, ~)ER( /I”); then t + $ =a s k ( /I”) $ for all $. Surely t + $ =F- s+ ( p*)$ for 
all $, by the definition of p( jJ*). Hence, (s, t)cR( p*). Hence, by induction on n, 
p(B*)= u Pi u R(B’)gR(D*). 
icw i<w 
Note that this is the place where we use the infinitary properties of fi*. 
Case 4: a=*?. 
Clearly, p($?)=R(IC/?) follows immediately by the definitions of p and R. 
The proof of the lemma now follows by induction on the structure of 4. Again, the 
only nontrivial case is q5 = (a)$. If Me,, s /= (a) $, then by claim 2 .&Z, s k R(~) + and, 
hence, by claim 1, J&‘, s t= (c() tj. 17 
Next we define, for each model JV, the model J? by replacing every state in W” by 
the set of propositions that hold at that state. We denote the state in W.‘correspond- 
ing to s by S. It is easy to see that 
for each proposition ~EQ. 
Definition 3.5. For each model &‘, the canonical model for .A! is [A] =(z),,. 
Theorem 3.6. For each proposition 4 and each model Af, J&?, s + qb ifs [_A!], [s] b qb. 
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 3.2 and 3.4. 0 
We can now define a universal Kripke model a. Consider the class X of all Kripke 
models. For each &EX we define the mapping d.,: W&H W” by 
We let the set of states W” of the universal model be exactly the set of all subsets of 
@ that can be obtained this way (when ~5’ ranges over all Kripke models). That is, for 
Y G @, YE W” iff Y = O,,(s) for some model M and state SE IV”. We define n” by 
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for 0 < i < co. The interpretation for the primitive programs is defined as 
P”(Uj)={(S,t)E W” X W”lV4*([Uj]4ES * +Et)} 
for O< j<o. Note that the states of 62 are precisely the semantically consistent 
complete sets of formulae. 
We can also describe the universal model as the model which results from “pasting 
together” all canonical models [A] for all Kripke models A. All states in 92 are 
“copies” of states in some canonical model [A]. 
Lemma 3.7. For each canonical model [A] and 01~17, p[“*](c() z p”(a). 
Proof. It follows immediately from the definitions of pt-‘I and p* that, for primitive 
a, pt-M1(a) E p”(u). The lemma follows. 0 
Lemma 3.8. Consider the universal model 4Y. 
(1) For each ~EQ and cc~l7, 
(cc)& 0 3t.(s,t)Ep(a)A4Et. 
(2) For each LEG, 
Proof. (1) (a): Let (CI)~ES. Then there exists a canonical model [A] and a state 
[S]E W[-/(] such that (CI) c$E[s]. Then there exists a [t]E WiA1 such that 
([s], [t])ep-“(cc) and qbE[t]. Hence, by Lemma 3.7, (s, t)ep*(a) and 4et. 
(-c=): Again define the function R : l7 H 2w x w as in Theorem 3.4 except that we use 
E instead of +. By the proof of that theorem, P(M) E R(a). Hence, if (s, t) EP(CI) and 4st, 
then (s, t)ER(M) and by the definition of R, (CI)~ES. 
(2) The proof is by induction on the structure of 4. For C#J primitive, the lemma 
holds by definition. Otherwise, we consider three cases. 
Case 1: (qb=$Vx) 
s + II/ V x iff s k $ or s + x iff, by the induction hypothesis, *ES or XES iff $ V XES by 
the maximality of s. 
Case 2: (4 = i $) 
Similar. 
Case 3: (4= (cI)+) 
s+ (a)$ iff there is a state tE W such that (s, t)Ep(a) and t /= t,b iff $Et by the 
induction hypothesis and (c()~Es by the first part of the lemma. 0 
The following theorem is an immediate consequence of the lemma. 
Theorem 3.9. There exists a universal Kripke model @ = ( W”, rcn4, p”) such that for each 
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Kripke model ~.4! =( W”, r’, p.“) there exists an embedding 8, : W.&H W” such that 
&‘,s+ 4 ifs @, e,,(s)+ q5 for each well-formed formula 4. 
Proof. The model %! constructed above and mappings Q,K for each A are the required 
model and mappings. 0 
We give two immediate consequences of Theorem 3.9 which will be instrumental for 
obtaining the results of the next section. 
Lemma 3.10. (1) For all propositions 4,4 is satisfiable if and only $4 is %-satisjiable. 
(2) For all propositions 4,@ is valid if and only if 4 is a-valid. 
4. Applications 
In this section we prove the completeness of the system AX and the correctness of 
a construction for a small model using the universal model @. 
4.1. Completeness of AX 
To prove the completeness of AX we adapt the Lindenbaum construction [l] to 
PDL. We impose a Boolean algebra structure on the state space W” of %2. With each 
proposition #J we associate the set of states that satisfy 4: 
I~I={=WI.+~~. 
Let P be the set of all such ) c$ I. We define a partial ordering d on P: 
I4I4$ 8 3-4. 
Lemma 4.1. 98 = (P, < ) is a complemented distributive lattice, i.e. a Boolean algebra. 
Proof. By propositional reasoning we have 
I-$-+true, 
t-false++, 
for all propositions $. Hence, we can take I true I = 1 and 1 false / = 0 in 28. 
Let I C#I / EP. Then its complement, I q3 I’, is defined as 
I&‘= isIsi= 4jc 
=IsIsl# 4) 
=isIsb 14) 
=I141 
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and [-I~IGP. 
Let Ic$I,III/IEP. Then 
Hence, 141 n lt+kl~P. By propositional reasoning, 
I-(4 A $)-6 and WA II/)-$. 
Hence, 14 A t,b I is a lower bound for { 141, I t,b I}. Suppose 1x1 is a lower bound too. 
Then l-x-4 and Ex-+I,!I. Hence, t-x-(+ A $). This shows that 14 A II/ I is the greatest 
lower bound, i.e. the infimum of (I&, I$[}. Similarly, I&J V $1 is the supremum of 
{ 141, I $ I}. Thus, 98 is a lattice. 
Let Iqf$It,kI,Ixl~P. Then I(~A$)V~IEP and because 
W(6 A $) V x) - ((4 V x) A ($ V x)), 
we get from the soundness theorem, 
I(~A~)vxl=l(~v~)A(~V~)l. 
This shows that !A? is a complemented distributive lattice. 0 
Lemma 4.2. In the Boolean algebra 3?‘, 
(1) [$I= 1 if and only if k$; 
(2) Ill/l=0 if and only if ElII/. 
Proof. (1) Let l&=1. Then for each I$IEP, jt+I<Ic#I. Hence, for each /$I, t$-4. 
Choose $ so that t$, then, by modus ponens, t-4. Conversely, suppose l-4. Then, for 
each $, EI,-~. Hence, for each $, I$1 < 141, so I&= 1 in a. 
(2) Similar. 0 
Lemma 4.3. For all proposition 4, if @+ I$, then kc& 
Proof. Suppose that 4 is not provable in the system AX. Then, by Lemma 4.2, in the 
Lindenbaum algebra g’, /+I# 1 and so I~$JI #O. Hence, there exists a state ~~1-141 
such that uzC,s+ 14. Hence, 4 is not @-valid. 0 
Theorem 4.4 (completeness theorem). + 4 if and only if k4. 
Proof. One direction is the soundness theorem. The other direction follows from 
Lemmas 3.10 and 4.3. 0 
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4.2. The small model theorem 
We find another application of Theorem 3.9 in a different proof of the small model 
theorem. This theorem is one of the basic results of the theory of PDL and was first 
discovered by Fischer and Ladner [3]. It states that every proposition 4 that is 
satisfiable, is satisfiable in a model with 2’+’ states. This fact immediately gives rise to 
a nai’ve doubly exponential time decision procedure for the validity problem for PDL: 
to check whether 4 is valid, generate all models with 2”#’ states and cycle through 
them in search of a model that satisfies 14. If such a model does not exist, then C$ is 
valid. Sherman and Hare1 [6, 171 proved the existence of a singly exponential time 
procedure by constructing a model zZ@ that satisfies C$ iff 4 is satisfiable, following an 
idea of Pratt [14]. Thus, one can construct a model in polynomial time and check 
whether this model satisfies 14 in exponential time. 
We first need a notion of the “subformulae” of a PDL formula 4. This concept is 
captured by the Fischer-Ladner closure of C#I [3]. 
Definition 4.5. Let ~EQ be a PDL formula. The Fischer-Ladner closure of 4, denoted 
by FL(c$), is the smallest set S of formulae containing 4 and satisfying the following 
closure rules for all aEno,a,bEJ7 and $,xE@. 
l$ES =a $ES, 
*VW =a *,x6 
(a)@S * IC/G 
The Fischer-Ladner closure of 4 is the set of all “subformulae” that are relevant for 
the meaning of 4. The set FL(4) induces an equivalence relation -+, on the state space 
W of any model M: 
s-,t iff V$EFL(C#I).(S+ IC/-+t+ $). 
In other words, we “Collapse” s and t if they are not distinguishable by any formula 
of FL(c$). We now define the quotient model A/FL(+): 
[s]={tIs 3,$t}, 
w-f’“(@) = { [s] 1 SE Iv”}, 
7C.K’FL’~’ (pi) = { [S] 1 S~lc’/“(pi)) for all piE@o, 
P’ K’FL(4)(aj) = { ([S], [t]) 1 (S, t)Ep.“(aj)} for all ajE170. 
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#W(B) and p~/FU~) are extended inductively to Zl and @ in the usual way. The 
following lemma, called the Filtration Lemma, is crucial for the theorem. 
Lemma 4.6 (filtration lemma). For all $EFL(c$) 
(1) g $=(c()x, then Vs,tEW”~{(s,t)Ep”K(G1)J([s],[t])Ep~’FL(~)(C1)}; 
(2) for all states s: 4, s+ $ o A/FL(@, [s] + $. 
Proof. Tedious but straightforward induction on the structure of $; see [3, 43 for 
details. 0 
We now consider the quotient model @/FL($). 
Lemma 4.7. For each tj~FL(4) 
$ is sutisjiuble ifs II/ is %/FL(4)-sutisfiuble. 
Proof. The lemma follows from Lemmas 3.10 and 4.6. 0 
Next we give another representation for the states of the quotient model %/FL(b). 
For each [S]E W p’FL(o), let s” be the set 
That is, s” is the set of formulae from FL(c#I) that hold at [s] together with the negations 
of the formulae from FL(c#I) that do not hold. We define the model Q+, by mapping in 
the filtration model @/FL(c$) each state [s] onto K The interpretation functions are 
adapted in the obvious way. From this construction we immediately get the following 
lemma. 
Lemma 4.8. For each formula $EFL(c#I) and [S]E W*IFLCQ), 
Theorem 4.9. For each formula $EFL(c#I), 
I,$ is sutisjuble ifs $~3 
for some state gE@+ 
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 4.7 and 4.8. 0 
The sets of formulae s” are called atoms of FL(+) and play a crucial role in the 
definition of the model 54,. For the definition of -c4, we follow the exposition in [6]. 
194 P.M. W. Knijnenbury, J. tm Leeuwen 
Definition 4.10. Let 2 be the set of PDL formulae in which all formulae of FL(4) and 
their negations occur. Then an atom of FL(4) is defined to be a subset A zZ such that 
for every a, /J’EI~ and $, XE@ 
if ~$EZ, then $EA iff l$$A; 
if $VxEZ, then I)VXEA iff $EA or XEA; 
if (@)$EZ, then (ab)$~A iff (cI)(B)$EA 
if (aup)$~Z, then (cxufi)$~A iff (a)$~.4 or (P)$EA; 
if (a*)$eZ, then (a*)$~.4 iff $EA or (a) (a*)$~& 
if (rc/?)x~Z, then ($?)xEA iff $EA and XEA. 
Note that for all $EFL(#), either II/ or l$ is contained in each atom. Denote the 
set of all atoms of FL(~!J) by At(4). From the definition of atoms it follows that an 
AEAt(4) is free of “obvious” or internal contradictions. In the construction of the 
model &‘, we will eliminate the “nonobvious” or external contradictions also. This 
model will be constructed in phases. For the definition of the interpretation functions 
7c and p we limit ourselves, without loss of generality, to the primitive predicate and 
program symbols occurring in 4. 
&‘,=(WO,zO,pO) is defined by 
l W, = At(4); 
l TQ,:@,H~” by Asn,(p) iff PEA; 
l pO : I7,,~2~” ’ w0 by (A, B)Ey,,(a) iff 
(1) there is a (a)$cA with $EB, and 
(2) for every [u]II/EA,IC/EB. 
For i>O,~i+,=(Wi+,,~i+,,pi+,) is defined by 
0 Wi+l= {Al AsWi, and for every (LX)$EA, there is BE Wi with (A,B)~pi(cr) and 
$EB); 
l 71i+l(P)=71i(P)n K+l; 
l Pi+l(a)=Pi(a)n(Y+, X wi+l). 
Here pi is the ordinary extension of pi to Il, except that for $EZ we define 
p:($?)= {(A, A) 1 $EA}. The unprimed p is the usual extension. 
It follows from the finiteness of At(#) and the fact that Wi+ 1 c Wi that there is a j for 
which the construction closes up, i.e. .di = zJj for each i >j. Accordingly, set Ld, = ~dj. 
The following lemma is the main technical lemma we need for our final result. 
Lemma 4.11. For eaery AE WC*‘+, 
(1) for each (c()$EFL(c$), (c()$gA ifs th ere exists a BE W’4 with (A, B)~p(a) and 
$EB; 
Proof. The proof proceeds by simultaneous induction on the structure of c( in (1) and 
the structure of $ in (2). See [17] for details. 0 
On models for propositional dynamic logic 195 
Theorem 4.12 (small model theorem). For all $EFL(~),$ is satisfiable iff t+b~A for 
some AE Wdb. 
Proof. In the light of Theorem 4.9, we only need to prove that W*b= Wd@, from 
which the theorem follows. 
l LV&~G W*@: immediate from the construction of %&; 
l suppose there exists an atom AE W’@@ and A$ Wd+. As we have started from the set 
of all atoms in W,, there exists a phase i in which the first such atom is removed 
from lJ$+ 1. Inspection of the algorithm shows that this can happen only if there 
exists a formula (c() $EA such that there exists no BE Wi with (A, B)~p;(cc) and $EB. 
But AE W%; hence, there exists a state BE W*@ with (A, B)~p(a) and $EB. Because 
A is the first state to be removed, BE Wi; a contradiction. 0 
5. An infinitary axiom system 
Intuitively, the nature of the *-operator requires an infinitary axiom system. We 
define the system AX, as such an infinitary system. The induction axiom is replaced 
by an inference rule with an infinite set of premisses. 
Definition 5.1. The injinitary axiom system AX, contains the following axioms. 
(1) All PDL axioms, except the induction axiom; 
(2) [cz*]~+[cx~]~, for each i<o; 
In addition, we have the following inference rules: 
(1) modus ponens: from 4, @-+$, infer $; 
(2) modal generalization: from 4, infer [a]& for any cr~Li’; 
(3) co-rule: from (Ic/-[p;(x’]~}i<w, infer $-+[fl;a*]4. 
In a way, we treat [IX*] C#J as an “abbreviation” for Ai<w[c(i] 4. By contraposition, 
we have, for each i<o, 
We define a derivation in AX, to be a countable sequence of well-formed formulae, 
each of which is either an instance of an axiom or the conclusion of an inference rule 
whose premisses occur earlier in the sequence. The last formula in the sequence is 
called the conclusion of the derivation and any formula 4 for which such a derivation 
exists is called derivable or provable and we write k,4. 
From the soundness theorem for AX, we immediately get a soundness theorem 
for AX,. 
Theorem 5.2 (soundness theorem). If k,& then +c#J. 
In both systems, AX and AX,, derivability of formulae of the form [a*] $J is closely 
related, as the following theorem shows; a proof of the theorem can be found in [7]. 
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Theorem 5.3. (1) In the injinitary system AX,, the induction axiom is derivable. 
(2) In the Segerberg system AX, k [@*I (~-+[cz]c$)-(~!J-[cP]~) for each n<o. 
We next give some definitions. Let Pr(AX,) = (4 1 I-, ~$1 be the set of all provable 
formulae of the axiom system AX,. For any subset C E @, let 2 be the union 
C u Pr(AX,) closed under modus ponens and co-rule. C is a theory if C = 2. Intuit- 
ively, 2 contains all immediate consequences of Z; in particular, if {[CC’] C#J I i < w} E Z, 
then [cc*]~E~. 
Definition 5.4. Let C be a set of formulae and 4 a formula. 
(1) Cl--m 4 if and only if 4 belongs to every theory that contains C. 
(2) We say that C is inconsistent iff Ckm false. 
(3) We say that C is consistent iff C is not inconsistent. 
(4) C is maximally consistent iff C is consistent and for each 4~@, either C$ or 
lC#)EC. 
We give some useful lemmas. 
Lemma 5.5. Let C be a maximally consistent theory. Then (c(*)c#IEC implies (ctm)4~C 
for some m<w. 
Lemma 5.6. Let C be a theory. Then C km 4 iff FEZ;. 
Theorem 5.7 (deduction theorem). Cu {4} km $ if and only if CI-, 4--+t,b. 
Proof. Suppose that Cu {4} km $. Let 
We show that A is a theory containing Cu {4}. Since $‘+(4-+$‘) is a tautology, 
$‘EA in case $‘EC or k--,$‘. Since 4-4 is a tautology, SEA. Hence, ZU{~>EA. 
From the tautology 
we deduce that A is closed under modus ponens. 
Finally, suppose that 
From the assumption we can deduce, using the co-rule and propositional reason- 
ing, that 
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Hence, A is closed under the co-rule. This proves one direction; the other direction 
is trivial. 0 
Corollary 5.8. C u { 4) is consistent ifs C fm 7 4. 
It is interesting to note that a semantic counterpart of the deduction theorem does 
not hold. For an easy example, consider a nontautology 4. Then we have {4} b [a] 4 
for all programs CI. But clearly k 4- [a]& This observation also prevents us from 
deriving a “strong” completeness theorem, i.e. r k, 4 iff r + 4: the deduction theorem 
together with the completeness theorem for AX, would imply a semantical deduction 
theorem. See, however, Corollary 5.11. We now define a model d by 
l Wd = {s E @ 1 Pr(AX,) E s and s is maximally consistent}, 
l z&(p) = {s 1 PES} for primitive predicates p, 
l p”(a)={(s,t)IV~.(CallC/ ES * $Et)} for primitive programs a. 
Lemma 5.9. For each proposition 4, 
Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of 4. For $ a primitive predicate, 
the theorem holds by definition. 
(4 = 1(1 V x): d, si= II/ V x iff d, s + $ or d, s j= x iff, by induction hypothesis, $ES or 
XES iff t,!~ V XES, by construction. 
(+=-I$): d,sl= i$ iff &,s/#$ iff $$s iff ALES. 
(4= (a)$): The only nontrivial case. We prove this case by induction on the 
structure of c(. 
First let CI = a be a primitive program. ~4, SF (a) $ iff there exists a state t such that 
(s, t)Ep(a) and AZ!, t+ $. By induction hypothesis, IC/et and by the definition of 
p(a), (u)$Es. Conversely, suppose (u)$Es. Consider the set 
Claim 1. r is a theory. 
Proof of Claim 1. Pr(AX,)sT, by the definition of s. Suppose $J, $+$~r, then 
$~r since the logic is normal. Suppose $-+[a; p’] 4~r for all i < o; then 
[u]($+[c~;/?~]c$)Es for all i<o. Hence, [a]$+[~] [~;/I*]~Es by the maximality of s. 
We argue that [u]($+[~;~*]~)Es. Suppose not. Then -~[a](tj-+[d;P*]~$)~s or 
and, by Lemma 5.5, 
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for some m<o; a contradiction. Hence, I- is closed under the co-rule and is a 
theory. 0 
Extend r to the set I-‘= Tu {$}. 
Claim 2. r’ is consistent. 
Proof of claim 2. Suppose r’ is inconsistent. Then, by Corollary 5.8, r k, l$. By 
Lemma 5.6, l$Er or [a] ~$Es. But (a)$~s by assumption; a contradiction. 0 
Proof of Lemma 5.9 (conclusion). Hence, r’ can be extended to a maximally consistent 
set t. By the definition of p, (s, t)Ep(a) and by induction hypothesis, d, tb I). Hence, 
.d,s~ (a)$. The case r is primitive, is proved. The other cases follow easily. 
.G!,.s~ (x?)J/ iff &,s+xA$ iff, by induction hypothesis. xA$~s iff (x?)Ic/~s. 
-d,sI=((ccu~)$ iff.(s,sI=((Co$V(fi)$ iff(~)$v(fl)$= iff(auB)$=. 
&,s/= (r;B>tj iff .d,s/= (2) (B)$ iR(c() (P)$Es iff (X;B)tics. 
Dually we prove [cc*]$~s iff .&,s+ [a*]$. A!, s+ [@*I$ iff, by definition of Kripke 
models, JZZ, s+ [r”] Ic/ for each n < o, iff, by induction hypothesis, [cc”] *ES for each 
n<w, iff, by the a-rule, [?*]$~s. 0 
With Lemma 5.9 we can easily prove the completeness of the system AX,. 
Theorem 5.10 (completeness theorem). For each PDL formula C#J, Fa, C$ i$‘ + Cp. 
Proof. One direction is the soundness theorem; for the other direction, let 4 be such 
that Yf,& Then Pr(AX,)u{ 1 4 > is consistent and can be extended to a maximally 
consistent set s by Lindenbaum’s theorem. Hence, SE IV” and cr4, s+ 1 #J by Lemma 
5.9, which implies that 4 is not valid or t+4. 0 
From the completeness theorem we immediately deduce the following weaker 
forms of the deduction and strong completeness theorems. 
Corollary 5.11. (1) d,r+ q5 gyrF-,4. 
(2) 4r+> I= ti ifS.d,r I= 4-fbk 
where &‘, r + #J holds if for all SE IV’, if s+ 4i for all $+F, then s+ 4, 
Since the Segerberg axiomatization is complete for PDL, we have the following 
corollary. 
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Let @ be the model as defined in the previous section. An immediate observation 
leads to the next lemma. 
Lemma 5.13. IV= W”. 
Proof. By soundness, each SEW” is maximally consistent and Pr(AX,)cs so 
W” E Wd. Conversely, IVd G W” by completeness. 0 
By the lemma and the constructions of $2 and d we get Theorem 5.14. 
Theorem 5.14. % s yc4. 
In fact we may say that % and d are only two different names for the same model 
and conclude that % = d. 
6. Nonstandard Models 
We have introduced a completeness technique for PDL which is based on an 
infinitary axiom system. One might ask whether this technique is applicable to the 
“normal” axiomatization as well. The answer to this question is “No”. The difficulty in 
proving a lemma such as Lemma 5.9 lies in the case $J = [a*] $. Let us see what 
happens when we try to prove the case. We can prove that &, SF [cz*] $ implies 
[GI”]$ES for each n <CO, but we may not infer then that [a*]$~s. In fact, we can prove 
the following theorem. 
Theorem 6.1. Let 
~=Pr(~X)~{~,C~l~,C~21~,...}u(~C~*l~} 
=Pr(AX)udu{i[a*]$}. 
Then r is consistent. 
Proof. Suppose r is inconsistent. Then for some Jinite subset 
~‘={&,&,...,&jCr, 
or 
Without loss of generality, we may assume that &= 1 [a*]$ and the other 
4jE A. By soundness, then, for all models JZ and states SE IV, 
J%‘, s + & A ‘.. A &- 1 + [a*] 4. But counterexamples are easily found. Hence, r is 
consistent. 0 
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Essentially, this is the same argument as we used for proving noncompactness. 
There we saw that an infinite, semantically inconsistent set could not be proved to be 
inconsistent by proving inconsistency of each of its finite subsets. In fact, each of its 
finite subsets was consistent. For exactly the same reason, namely, syntactic consist- 
ency of each of the finite subsets of r, we must conclude that F itself is syntactically 
consistent. Yet it surely is nor semantically consistent in standard Kripke models. We 
therefore conclude that syntactic and semantic consequences are two different notions 
in the case of the axiom system AX and standard models. 
As has been noted in [4, 111, we can construct a syntax model G!’ from the 
Segerberg axiomatization that is a nonstandard model in the following sense. 
Definition 6.2. A nonstandard Kripke model is any model ,K that is a Kripke model 
according to Definition 2.1, except that p.#(~*) need not be the reflexive transitive 
closure of p,“(a), but only a reflexive transitive relation containing p.“(a) and satisfying 
the induction axiom. 
In a way we might view this relaxation as a means to “compactify” the logic: the set 
F from Theorem 6.1 is satisfiable in a nonstandard model. In nonstandard models the 
set p(cc*) is simply larger than in standard models. 
The construction of &’ proceeds as follows. Let consistency for E be defined in the 
usual way (cf [l 11). 
l IV”‘= {SC @ 1 Pr(AX)gs and s is maximally consistent}; 
0 n.“‘(p) = {s 1 PES} for primitive p; 
0 p.“‘(cc)=((s,t)Iv~.([a]~Es~ @t)}. 
Note the definition of #’ which is defined for all programs, rather than only for 
primitive one’s, 
Theorem 6.3. Let ~2’ be the syntax model constructed from the Segerberg axiom system 
as indicated above. Then 
(1) d’ is nonstandard; 
(2) &’ is universal in the class of nonstandard models. 
Proof. For (l), see [4, 111. For (2), it is sufficient to prove 
a?‘,~/=4 iff 4~s. 
To prove this claim we can adapt the proof of Lemma 5.9, or see [2]. q 
Corollary 6.4. The Segerberg system AX is complete fbr PDL with respect to nonstan- 
dard models. 
Note that the infinitary system is not complete with respect to these models. 
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7. Dynamic algebras 
In this section we recall the notion of dynamic algebras [S, 9,151 and study the 
relationship between these algebras and Kripke models. 
Dynamic algebras were introduced by Kozen [S, 91 and Pratt [15] to give PDL 
a more algebraic interpretation, in much the same way as Boolean algebras give an 
interpretation for propositional logic. 
A dynamic algebra is a two-sorted algebra D =( K, B, O), where K is a Kleene or 
relational algebra and B is a Boolean algebra, for which a scalar multiplication 
0 : K x B H B is defined. The basic operators for the Boolean algebra are A, V and 
1; the operators for the Kleene algebra are ;, v and *. The defining axioms for the 
Boolean algebra are standard. However, we do not have equality for the Kleene 
elements. Instead, we axiomatize the meaning of 0. As we have seen, there exist two 
axiomatizations for PDL that are sound and complete; Pratt used the Segerberg 
system and Kozen the infinitary system to axiomatize their versions of dynamic 
algebras. We concentrate on the version of Kozen, which is called *-continuous. 
Hence, we have as axioms 
(1) the axioms for Boolean algebras; 
(2) (a)O=O; 
(3) (a>(6V$)=(~MV<~)$; 
(4) <‘%B>6=<a><P>& 
(5) <auP>~=(Co~V<PM 
(6) <~*>6=Vi<o<~i>6. 
Here we have used 4, $ to denote the Boolean elements and CI, /? to denote the 
Kleene elements. Let @,, and Z7, be the sets of names for (primitive) propositions and 
programs as defined in Section 2. These names act as names for constants in these 
algebras. Let 3 be the class of all *-continuous dynamic algebras with sets of 
constants QO and Z7,. 9 is equationally defined and, thus, has an initial algebra 9. We 
construct 9 as follows. Let T be the term algebra generated over QO and II,. Then 
T= (@, Ii’, 0) and 9 = (@/ =, II, 0). Let D be any member of 9; then every assignment 
of elements of D to the sets @e and 17, extends to a homomorphism of 9 into D. An 
immediate observation is 
With every Kripke model J%’ we can easily associate a dynamic algebra J?. With 
every C$ E @ we associate the subset 14 1 E W, where 1 41 is defined by 
Denote the set of all such subsets 141 by (@I”. Similarly, with every aEl7 we 
associate the function I a I defined by 
202 P.M. W. Knijnenburg, J. cm Leruwrn 
Denote the set of all such functions ( CI / by I Ill.‘. We let ,.z? = ( I@ I,‘, I I7j.‘, O), 
Lemma 7.1. For every Kripke model A’, ./f is well dejined. 
Proof. We have already proven that I @ 1.’ is a Boolean algebra. For the Kleene part of 
.,.&?, we define operators and prove the axioms. 
(?i= 1x1): axioms (2) and (3) obviously hold. 
(~=I~I;IPI): 
def 
~I~l;IBI>I~I=l~~;P~~l 
(E=(~x(uiflI): Similar. 
(j;=Izl*): 
def 
(l~l*>l~l=l(~*~4l 
Next we consider th”e algebra ~2. A first observation is that every (associated) 
algebra .,6? is a subalgebra of ~8: the embedding %,, of w’ into PV” extends to an 
embedding of ,# into &. The main result of this section is now immediate. 
Theorem 7.2. % E 9. 
Proof. Consider the mapping .f‘: JC&.~ defined by 
l f(l4l)=@ 
l .f(I4)=~. 
j is clearly surjective. f is injective as well: 
“@44l#lt4 - “W4--Ic/ 
- f&b-$ 
0 <#4=$ 
- Jk4#$. 
Finally, by Lemma 7.1, ,f is a homomorphism. 0 
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